Opinions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals of South Carolina advance sheet no. 35 by South Carolina Supreme Court
OPINIONS 
OF 
THE SUPREME COURT 
AND 
COURT OF APPEALS 
OF 
SOUTH CAROLINA 
ADVANCE SHEET NO. 35 
September 4, 2019 
Daniel E. Shearouse, Clerk 




THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH CAROLINA 




PETITIONS - UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
27860 - Sarah Denise Cardwell v. State Pending 
2018-MO-039 - Betty and Lisa Fisher v. Bessie Huckabee Pending 
2018-MO-041 - Betty Fisher v. Bessie Huckabee AND 
      Lisa Fisher v. Bessie Huckabee Pending 
Order - In the Matter of Cynthia E. Collie                     Pending 
2018-001253 - Steven Barnes v. SCDC Pending 
PETITIONS FOR REHEARING 
27859 - In the Matter of Jennifer Elizabeth Meehan  Pending 
27900 - Anthony Marquese Martin v. State Pending 
27903 - State v. James S. Cross Pending 
27904 - Crystal Wickersham v. Ford Motor Co. Pending 
27905 - Daufuskie Island v. SC Office of Regulatory Staff Pending 
27908 - A. Marion Stone, III v. Susan B. Thompson Pending 
2 
27910 - State v. Shane Adam Burdette Pending 
27911 - Derrick Fishburne v. State Pending 
27913 - Antrell Felder v. State Pending 
27915 - Vladimir W. Pantovich v. State Pending 
2019-MO-033 - State v. Gary Eugene Lott Pending 
3 
The South Carolina Court of Appeals 
PUBLISHED OPINIONS 
5683-The State v . Ont ar io Stefon Patric k Makin s  7  
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS 
2019-UP-313-SCDSS v. Amber Muirhead 
(Filed August 29, 2019) 
2019-UP-314-David Directo v. SCDSS
 (Filed August 29, 2019) 
PETITIONS FOR REHEARING 
5633-William Loflin v. BMP Development, LP Pending 
5636-Win Myat v. Tuomey Regional Medical Center  Pending 
5643-Ashley Reeves v. SCMIRF  Pending 
5657-Adele Pope v. Alan Wilson Denied 08/27/19 
5661-Palmetto Construction Group, LLC v. Restoration Specialists (2) Pending 
5669-Jeffrey Kennedy v. Richland School Dt. Two Pending 
5673-Cricket Store 17 v. City of Columbia   Pending 
5676-H. Marshall Hoyler v. State of South Carolina   Pending 
5677-State v. Joseph Bowers Pending 
2019-UP-099-John Doe v. Board of Zoning Appeals Pending 
2019-UP-213-Timothy Hannah v. MJV                              Pending 
4 
2019-UP-256-Demetrius Simmons v. State  Pending 
2019-UP-265-Sharon Wazney v. Robert Wazney (3)                                      Pending 
2019-UP-270-Deep Keel v. Atlantic Private Equity               Pending 
2019-UP-272-State v. John M. Ghent, Jr. Pending 
2019-UP-283-Kathlenn Kelly v. James Rachels Pending 
2019-UP-284-Bank of New York Mellon v. Cathy Lanier Pending 
2019-UP-293-Thayer Arredondo v. SNH SE Ashley River Tenant Pending 
2019-UP-295-State v. Anthony M. Enrequez  Pending 
PETITIONS-SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT 
5606-George Clark v. Pat ric ia Clark      Pending  
5617-Maria Allwin v. Russ Cooper Associates, Inc.    Pending  
5618-Jean Derric k v. Lis a M oore       Pending  
5625-Angie Keene v. CN A  Holdi ngs      Pending  
5630-State v. Joh n K enne th Masse y, Jr.      P ending  
5637-Lee Moore v. Deb ra Moore       Pending  
5639-Hugh Deree de v. Cou rt ney Feeley -Karp     Pending  
5641-Robert Palme r v. Sta te e t al.       P ending  
5642-State v. Dea n  Alton Holco mb      Pending  
5644-Hilda Stott v. White Oak Manor, Inc.     Pending  
5646-Grays Hill Baptist Church v. Beaufort County    Pending  
5650-State v. Fel ix  Kotow ski       Pending  
5 
2017-UP-338-Clarence Winfrey v. Archway Services, Inc. (3) Pending 
2019-UP-047-Michael Landr y v. Ang el a Landr y    Granted 08/16 /19 
2019-UP-067-Lorrie Dibernardo v. Carolina Cardiology Pending 
2019-UP-100-State v. Rha jo n Sande rs      Pending  
2019-UP-110-Kenji Kilgore v. Estate of Samuel Joe Dixon Pending 
2019-UP-128-Wilson Garner, Jr. v. Nell Gaines     Pending  
2019-UP-146-State v. Jus tin Anton io Butler     Pending  
2019-UP-172-Robert Gillmann v. Beth Gillman     Pending  
2019-UP-178-Arthur Eleazer v. Leslie Hughey     Pending  
2019-UP-179-Paula Rose v. Charles Rose, III     Pending  
2019-UP-215-Valerie Lawso n v. Erin S mith     Pending  
6 
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
In The Court of Appeals 
The State, Respondent, 
v. 
Ontario Stefon Patrick Makins, Appellant. 
Appellate Case No. 2016-002495 
Appeal From Greenville County 
Robin B. Stilwell, Circuit Court Judge 
Opinion No. 5683 
Heard November 7, 2018 – Filed September 4, 2019 
REVERSED AND REMANDED 
Appellate Defender Taylor Davis Gilliam, of Columbia, 
for Appellant. 
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant 
Deputy Attorney General David A. Spencer, both of 
Columbia; and Solicitor William Walter Wilkins, III, of 
Greenville; for Respondent. 
MCDONALD, J.:  Ontario Stefon Patrick Makins appeals his conviction for third 
degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC) with a minor, arguing the circuit court erred 
in (1) refusing to allow Makins to cross-examine the victim (Victim) about her 
prior allegations of sexual abuse and (2) allowing a therapist to essentially vouch 
for Victim's credibility by testifying both as a fact witness regarding Victim's 
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allegations of abuse and an expert witness on child sexual abuse trauma.  We 
reverse and remand for a new trial.  
Facts and Procedural History 
In March 2015, training specialists from the Julie Valentine Center1 visited 
Mitchell Road Elementary School in Greenville to discuss safety and 
"inappropriate touching" with students.  Approximately two weeks later, on March 
20, 2015, Victim reported to her teacher, Mary Kroske (Teacher), that she had been 
sexually abused. Teacher reported Victim's disclosure to the school's guidance 
counselor. 
Investigator David Picone of the Greenville County Sheriff's Department (GCSD), 
responded to the school to investigate Victim's report.  Picone spoke with Victim's 
mother, Teacher, and Victim about Victim's disclosure.  Victim reported to 
Investigator Picone that she was abused by her sister's boyfriend, Makins, at the 
home where the couple lived with their children; Victim stated the abuse began 
when she was five years old.  Investigator Picone testified he did not question 
Victim, who was eight at the time, about the details of the alleged abuse.  Instead, 
he followed GCSD's procedure for referring children under the age of twelve to the 
Julie Valentine Center for a forensic interview.   
On March 23, 2015, Investigator Picone interviewed Makins and informed him of 
Victim's allegations of sexual abuse, which Makins denied.  While at the GCSD, 
Makins also met with the South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS) to 
discuss DSS's safety plan.   
On April 21, 2015, Christine Carlberg of the Julie Valentine Center conducted a 
forensic interview with Victim.2  After viewing the forensic interview, Investigator 
Picone determined probable cause existed to arrest Makins.  On August 23, 2016, 
the grand jury indicted Makins for CSC with a minor, first degree; lewd act upon a 
minor; and CSC with a minor, third degree. 
1 The Julie Valentine Center is a sexual assault and child abuse recovery center in 
Greenville County. 
2 The circuit court admitted the tape of the forensic interview into evidence.  
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At Makins's trial, Victim testified that on more than one occasion, Makins asked 
her to perform oral sex, touched her inappropriately, and showed her a sexually-
oriented website on his cell phone.3 Victim admitted she lied to the police when 
she reported Makins threatened to kill her if she disclosed the abuse.  Although the 
jury found Makins "not guilty" on the CSC (first) and lewd act indictments, it 
found him guilty of CSC (third) with a minor.  The circuit court sentenced Makins 
to ten years' imprisonment. 
Standard of Review 
"A trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony will not be reversed 
absent a prejudicial abuse of discretion.  An abuse of discretion occurs when the 
conclusions of the circuit court are either controlled by an error of law or are based 
on unsupported factual conclusions."  State v. Chavis, 412 S.C. 101, 106, 771 
S.E.2d 336, 338 (2015) (citation omitted).  
Law and Analysis 
Kristin Rich's Testimony 
Makins argues the circuit court erred in allowing therapist Kristin Rich to 
indirectly bolster Victim's testimony by permitting Rich to testify as both an expert 
in child sexual abuse trauma and as a fact witness regarding Victim's allegations of 
sexual abuse. We agree. 
"Expert testimony on rape trauma may be more crucial in situations where children 
are victims.  The inexperience and impressionability of children often render them 
unable to effectively articulate the events giving rise to criminal sexual behavior."  
State v. White, 361 S.C. 407, 414-15, 605 S.E.2d 540, 544 (2004).  While our 
supreme court has recognized an expertise in child abuse assessment, it has 
cautioned that "allow[ing] the person who examined the child to testify to the 
characteristics of victims runs the risk that the expert will vouch for the alleged 
victim's credibility."  State v. Anderson, 413 S.C. 212, 218-19, 776 S.E.2d 76, 79 
(2015). The better practice "is not to have the individual who examined the alleged 
3 Victim was ten years old at the time of trial. 
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victim testify, but rather to call an independent expert."  Id. at 218, 776 S.E.2d at 
79. 
"The assessment of witness credibility is within the exclusive province of the jury." 
State v. McKerley, 397 S.C. 461, 464, 725 S.E.2d 139, 141 (Ct. App. 2012).  "[A] 
witness may not give an opinion for the purpose of conveying to the jury—directly 
or indirectly—that she believes the victim."  Briggs v. State, 421 S.C. 316, 324, 
806 S.E.2d 713, 717 (2017). "Specifically, it is improper for a witness to testify as 
to his or her opinion about the credibility of a child victim in a sexual abuse 
matter." State v. Kromah, 401 S.C. 340, 358-59, 737 S.E.2d 490, 500 (2013).  A 
witness should avoid statements: 
• explaining that the child was told to be truthful; 
• expressing a direct opinion as to a child's veracity or tendency to tell the 
truth; 
• indirectly vouching for the child's believability, such as a statement that the 
interviewer has made a "compelling finding" of abuse; 
• indicating to a jury that the interviewer believes the child's allegations in 
the current matter; or 
• providing an opinion that the child's behavior indicated the child was 
telling the truth. 
Id. at 360, 737 S.E.2d at 500. 
During the pretrial discussion of Rich's proposed testimony, the circuit court stated 
it was not necessarily concerned with her qualifications as an expert witness, but 
with the substance of the opinion she would offer.  The State explained, "We'll 
certainly stay far, far away from [Kromah]," and Rich would not be testifying as to 
the Victim's credibility.  The State's plan was for Rich to testify about the 
symptoms a child sexual abuse victim might display, as well as certain treatment 
techniques, and discuss the concepts of delayed disclosure and piecemeal 
disclosure. 
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And then we will move into some details of her treatment 
of this victim. You know, was she diagnosed with 
anything? What was that diagnosis?  What symptoms 
did Minor exhibit?  What therapy model she exhibited?  
And then, whether or not there was, in fact, a disclosure 
and time and place of that disclosure. 
Makins's counsel responded that he was "very likely to object to most all of that" 
because while the questions themselves might be appropriate as outlined by the 
solicitor, he had no idea what Rich's answers would be.  The circuit court replied: 
This is my concern about this witness and why I'm 
somewhat circumspect.  We have a long line of cases 
which discuss expert witness buttressing and credibility 
of minor witnesses.  And although I think that most of 
what she talked about in a vacuum is okay, my concern is 
that she begins to talk about the specific treatment and 
discussions with this child and without saying "that 
makes her believeable" she is suggesting that that makes 
her believeable. 
And I want to make sure that what we're not doing is an 
end run around forensic interviewers being qualified as 
expert witnesses and thereby buttressing the credibility of 
witnesses. 
The court further explained that while it had not seen a case specifically 
disallowing the testimony the solicitor sought to offer, "on the other hand, I haven't 
seen one where the court has accepted anything, other than the blind testimony."  
The State responded that Rich would not testify "about a diagnosis of child sexual 
abuse. She will discuss a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder. But we will 
not get into the diagnosis of child sexual abuse."  Makins again objected, noting:  
'My one concern then is why is she being offered as an 
expert on child sexual abuse dynamics?  
As soon as she gets into saying anything about this is 
what we see for child sexual abuse, 'these are the 
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symptoms, I found them, they exist in this case', we're 
going to have trouble.   
The circuit court took the matter under advisement, noting the defense would be 
ready to make the necessary contemporaneous objections.  Still, the court 
expressed its preference for a blind expert, reiterating the State would have to walk 
a tight line in offering the testimony.  The circuit court again expressed its concern 
about Rich's proposed testimony prior to opening statements, explaining, "I'm 
concerned that if she starts matching up her testimony with [Victim's] symptoms, 
we are essentially establishing a circumstance where she is vouching for the 
credibility of [Victim].  If that happens, I don't think that I have any choice but to 
declare a mistrial and I don't want to get there."   
The circuit court qualified Rich as an expert "in the treatment of child trauma and 
child sexual abuse dynamics," and Rich testified about the symptoms child victims 
of sexual abuse may exhibit, the concepts of delayed disclosure and piecemeal 
disclosure, and therapy methods for treating child victims of sexual abuse. In 
describing the use of therapy to help child victims express themselves, Rich 
explained, "Oftentimes, with younger children what we do, they have a hard time 
talking about things so we allow them to draw or just introduce that to a way—can 
you draw what happened. And they're much more likely to draw rather than just to 
talk." The solicitor then asked: 
Q. I want to move a little more specifically.  Have you 
provided therapy to the victim in this case, Minor? 
A. Yes. 
Makins advised the circuit court he had a motion to discuss outside the presence of 
the jury. Makins moved for a mistrial because Rich had just testified that she 
treated people diagnosed with trauma due to several causes, including sexual 
abuse; she had described the symptoms of sexual abuse, including the phenomena 
of delayed and piecemeal disclosure; and she then answered, more specifically, 
that she had treated Victim. Makins asserted this testimony essentially implied 
Victim suffered trauma from sexual abuse, "[s]o she is vouching for the credibility 
of the witness by saying in essence, 'if she didn't suffer trauma, I wouldn't be 
working with her. I only work with people who have suffered a trauma.'"  
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The circuit court found Rich had not "gotten to the point of vouching yet," but she 
could testify only that she treated Victim for the purpose of reporting that Victim 
disclosed the sexual abuse to her.4  Although the circuit court had previously ruled 
Rich could testify that she treated Victim and Victim was diagnosed with post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)—with no discussion of Victim's symptoms—the 
court modified this ruling, determining Rich would not be permitted to testify 
about her specific treatment and diagnosis of Victim because such testimony would 
be the equivalent of vouching.  Back in the presence of the jury, Rich's direct 
examination continued: 
Q. Ms. Rich, did you provide treatment to the victim 
in this case, Minor? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did Minor disclose sexual abuse to you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And how did she tell you about this? 
A. She told me in the context of a therapy session. 
Q. And did she talk about it?  Did she do anything 
else? 
A. She drew a picture. 
The State then produced State's Exhibit 4, which Rich identified as the picture 
Victim drew when Rich asked her "to talk about or to share, draw a picture about 
the worst time of the sexual abuse that she reports that happened."  Rich further 
testified this was Victim's original drawing, bearing some of Rich's notes, and she 
had Victim draw it as part of Victim's therapy.  Rich then discussed the drawing 
and the open-ended questions she asked Victim pursuant to the therapy model.  
The drawing contains graphic descriptive language, and it is compelling evidence. 
4 Section 17-23-175 of the S.C. Code permits the admission of some "out-of-court 
statements by child sexual abuse victims under the age of twelve when certain 
conditions are met." Kromah, 401 S.C. at 360 n.7, 737 S.E.2d at 500 n7. 
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At the close of the case, Makins renewed his motion for a mistrial, arguing again 
that Rich indirectly vouched for Victim's credibility.  The circuit court denied the 
mistrial motion but stated Makins could ask for a curative instruction to state an 
expert witness cannot vouch for the veracity of a witness.  Later, within the jury 
charge, the circuit court instructed, "Also understand that no witness, even an 
expert witness can vouch for the credibility of another witness'[s] testimony." 
Initially, we note that even though Rich was not the designated forensic 
interviewer, her testimony was akin to that of a forensic interviewer, rather than a 
blind expert. Rich testified she treated Victim, and the content of much of her lay 
testimony was similar to that of a forensic interviewer—i.e. Victim's disclosure of 
the details of the alleged abuse. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 411 S.C. 332, 345, 768 
S.E.2d 249, 253 (Ct. App. 2015) (distinguishing improper bolstering in cases 
involving witnesses who performed the forensic interview, interviewed minor 
victims, or commented on the credibility of minor victims from those involving 
independent mental health experts who "offered admissible expert testimony 
regarding the general behavioral characteristics of child sex abuse victims" and did 
not testify about the applicability of such testimony to the victim), abrogated on 
other grounds by State v. Jones, 423 S.C. 631, 817 S.E.2d 268 (2018). 
We find Rich's opinion testimony addressing the various manifestations of child 
sexual abuse, followed immediately by her affirmative response that she treated 
Victim, implied she believed Victim was telling the truth with respect to her 
allegations of sexual abuse. If Rich believed Victim had not been telling the truth, 
Rich would not have needed to treat her.  As the circuit court warned, Rich's 
testimony implied she was treating Victim for sexual trauma because Victim had 
suffered such trauma. See Briggs, 421 S.C. at 324, 806 S.E.2d at 717 ("[A] witness 
may not give an opinion for the purpose of conveying to the jury—directly or 
indirectly—that she believes the victim." (emphasis added)); State v. Dawkins, 297 
S.C. 386, 393, 377 S.E.2d 298, 302 (1989) (holding treating psychiatrist 
improperly bolstered the credibility of the victim when "the solicitor posed the 
following question-'Based on your examination and your observations of Pamela, 
are you of the impression that her symptoms are genuine?', to which the doctor 
answered, 'yes'"); McKerley, 397 S.C. at 465, 725 S.E.2d at 142 (holding that 
although the forensic interviewer "never testified directly that she believed what 
the victim stated in her interviews or in her testimony . . . [her] testimony in this 
case describing what forensic interviewers do demonstrates that virtually all of her 
testimony indicates she believed victim was truthful"). 
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Allowing this improper testimony was not harmless because the State's case hinged 
on Victim's credibility. See State v. Jennings, 394 S.C. 473, 480, 716 S.E.2d 91, 
94-95 (2011) ("The only evidence presented by the State was the children's 
accounts of what occurred and other hearsay evidence of the children's accounts.  
Because the children's credibility was the most critical determination of this case, 
we find the admission of the [forensic interviewer's] written reports was not 
harmless.").  Moreover, "although an expert's testimony theoretically is to be given 
no more weight by a jury than any other witness, it is an inescapable fact that 
jurors can have a tendency to attach more significance to the testimony of experts."  
Kromah, 401 S.C. at 357, 737 S.E.2d at 499; see also Briggs, 421 S.C. at 334, 806 
S.E.2d at 722 ("In addition, as we explained in Kromah, the 'impermissible harm' 
from improper bolstering 'is compounded' when the witness is 'qualified as an 
expert.'"). 
"To deem an error harmless, this court must determine 'beyond a reasonable doubt 
the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.'"  McKerley, 397 
S.C. at 467, 795 S.E.2d at 143. In light of Rich's testimony discussing the therapy 
needed by child sexual abuse victims, the drawing method therapists use to obtain 
disclosures from young victims, Rich's treatment of the child Victim here, and the 
way Rich obtained Victim's most detailed disclosure—the drawing—we cannot say 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" that Rich's indirect bolstering did not contribute to the 
verdict obtained when considered in the context of the other evidence in this case.   
Finally, we find the circuit court's jury instruction was insufficient to cure this 
error, in part because the court did not immediately instruct the jury when the error 
occurred. See State v. Sweet, 342 S.C. 342, 349-50, 536 S.E.2d 91, 95 (Ct. App. 
2000) (noting that "because the trial judge did not give an immediate curative 
instruction, this case is distinguishable from those cases where a curative 
instruction given in conjunction with a general jury instruction was sufficient to 
cure the improper comment on a defendant's failure to testify").  An isolated 
statement, buried in the midst of the circuit court's jury instructions and 
unconnected to any specific witness or statement, could not cure the prejudice 
here. Cf. State v. Dempsey, 340 S.C. 565, 571, 532 S.E.2d 306, 310 (noting trial 
court's curative instructions during and immediately following child sexual abuse 
counselor's bolstering testimony cured any prejudice flowing from the improper 
vouching). 
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For these reasons, we reverse Makins's conviction and remand for a new trial.5 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
KONDUROS and HILL, JJ., concur.  
5 Because we find the admission of Rich's testimony requires reversal, we decline 
to address Makins's additional assignments of error.  See Futch v. McAllister 
Towing of Gerorgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) 
(declining to address remaining issues when determination of a prior issue is 
dispositive).  
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